Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E, Zoroaster and H.A. Prichard

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
In philosophy the truth can only be reached via the ruins of the false [Prichard]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness [Halbach/Leigh]
If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 2. FS Truth Axioms
The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 3. KF Truth Axioms
KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts [Halbach/Leigh]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories [Halbach/Leigh]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
The 'Ethics' is disappointing, because it fails to try to justify our duties [Prichard]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
The mistake is to think we can prove what can only be seen directly in moral thinking [Prichard]
I see the need to pay a debt in a particular instance, and any instance will do [Prichard]
The complexities of life make it almost impossible to assess morality from a universal viewpoint [Prichard]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Virtues won't generate an obligation, so it isn't a basis for morality [Prichard]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
We feel obligations to overcome our own failings, and these are not relations to other people [Prichard]
Seeing the goodness of an effect creates the duty to produce it, not the desire [Prichard]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
If pain were instrinsically wrong, it would be immoral to inflict it on ourselves [Prichard]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 1. Monotheistic Religion
Zoroaster and the Hebrew prophets evolved different versions of monotheism [Zoroaster, by Armstrong,K]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 3. Zoroastrianism
Zarathustra was the first to present a god who is an abstract concept [Zoroaster]
Zoroastrianism saw the world as a battle between good evil gods [Zoroaster, by Harari]